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I. General overview of public administration 
 
 
Hungary is a parliamentary democracy. From the point of view of the territorial dimension of 
governance, it is a unitary state with a two-tier local government system (municipal and county 
level elected self-governments; hereinafter local governments). The constitutional-legal status, 
i.e. arrangement guaranteeing the broad autonomy of local governments is exceptionally strong, 
as are their functions in the provision of public services and in the administration/implementation 
of central government policies.  
The electoral system is a mixed one, involving elements of both the majority and the 
proportional system; the mechanism, however, strongly favours large parties rather small ones. 
Representatives of the single-chamber Parliament are elected either in individual constituencies  
or on party lists. In 2008, there were four parties in the House of Representatives. During the five 
election periods having taken place since the transition, all governments were (either two- or 
three-party) coalition governments. 
The President, elected indirectly by Parliament, has a formal, rather than substantive role; 
however, in times of political crises, the President has important functions as an arbitrator 
between political parties and as the supreme commander of the armed forces.  
 
The Hungarian administrative system has, from a formal-institutional aspect, all the features 
characteristic for Continental European administrative systems.  
The central government sub-system is divided into ministries (currently, there are 15 of them). 
At the core of this sub-system one finds the Prime Minister’s Office, which is, contrary to its 
name, actually a large, chancellery-type organization. Ministries are chiefly responsible for 
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policymaking while most of the implementation tasks – especially those having a territorial 
dimension – are carried out by centrally supervised administrative organizations (so-called de-
concentrated organs). However, there are important exceptions to the above role, such as 
centralized public procurement, which is located in the Prime Minister’s Office.  
The local governmental system is a two-tier one. The territory of Hungary is sub-divided into 
nineteen counties, while the capital city Budapest has a special administrative status. Counties, as 
well as Budapest, have elected councils and self-governments having a broad task portfolio in 
public service provision. This upper tier of the self-government system is responsible, among 
others, for the middle level health and the secondary education services.  
The lower tier of the local government system includes the municipalities (in Budapest, district  
local governments). They are governed by elected councils. Local governments are responsible 
for another broad set of public service provision tasks, including kindergarten, primary school,  
basic health, and local physical infrastructure services.  
 
Administrative culture 
 
Hajnal (2009) places the Hungarian administrative culture closer to the Rechsstaat (legalist 
system) culture. In a Rechsstaat culture the state is expected to fulfill a decisive integrative role 
in the society. Furthermore, such administrative culture is charac terized by the presence of a 
large and distinct body of administrative law with a dominant role of law and legalism in the way 
the government thinks and acts. There is some further empirical evidence that legal thinking is a 
central component of the Hungarian public administration. 
The way Law and Public Administration/Public Management relate to one another can be 
assessed on the basis of looking at how these subjects are studied and taught in academia. In this 
regard, Hungarian PA seems to be extremely legalist. A statistical analysis of PA-related 
academic programmes in 23 European countries identified three distinct clusters of countries: 
one characterised by a predominantly legalistic, one by a management oriented, and a third one 
characterised by in interdisciplinary approach to teaching PA. This analysis put Hungary, along 
with a number of Central/Eastern European and Mediterranean countries, into the group of 
countries characterised by an overwhelmingly (Public) Law -based approach to public 
administration (Hajnal 2003). 
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In analysing Hungarian administrative culture, examining the educational background of civil 
servants is also instructive. Empirical analysis of the subject concludes that graduates of Law  
still play a pre-eminent role in the Hungarian public administration. This claim is supported by 
two arguments. 
First, they are strongly (by about 100 % in 2005) over-represented in sub-sets of higher 
importance, such as (i) among civil servants in managerial positions and (ii) in ministries. It is 
particularly peculiar that in its days, in the Senior Civil Service consisting of the highest ranking 
civil servants, 57 % of civil servants had a degree in Law (Gajduschek 2006 p. 605). Second, 
legal regulations make it clear that in practice, lawyers are definitely perceived as the most 
competent generalists of administration. Examples include the exemption rules on the so-called 
“specialised examination system” of civil servants compulsory for a large majority of 
administrators: only lawyers are exempted from the obligations of passing this – mostly legal 
type – exam. The situation is similar with the General Basic Public Administration Examination 
scheme (Gajduschek-Hajnal 2000). 
In sum, on the basis of available evidence it can be concluded that Hungary lies much closer to 
the Rechtsstaat than to the public interest pole of the administrative tradition continuum. 
However, at the end of this brief analysis, a note of caution seems justified. A German, French or 
North European Rechtsstaat, naturally, differs from a Hungarian (or, for that matter, a Romanian 
or Greek) one in many respects. There is, however, a crucial difference possibly hampering the 
meaningful usage of the “Rechtsstaat vs. public interest” concept. Namely, deviations from the 
Weberian ideal of “law making – law enforcement” seem systematic and structural (as opposed 
to being chance errors or rare failures). In other words, the Rechtsstaat façade seems to cover a 
significantly different reality, whereby (i) legal norms are often trivially unable to serve any 
meaningful policy purpose as (ii) they were not intended to do so even by those having made 
them; but (iii) they serve latent purposes of small factions or of symbolic policy. Moreover, (iv) 
laws often are not implemented, as they were not even meant to be implemented – this would 
have often been clearly impossible anyway –, but the real content of the law is decided in the 
implementation phase, in which, factors such as state actors’ different interpretations of the law 
and conflicting micro-political interests, and selective/illegitimate law enforcement (or the lack 
thereof) play a central role.  
 
 4 
 
 Historical period of public administration 
 
Communist government is often seen as an omnipotent actor unilaterally superimposing its will 
on practically all segments of society with reckless effectiveness. This view dominated 
exclusively, and to a significant extent still characterises, the way administrative transformation 
has been/is perceived by international actors. A logical consequence of this premise is that a 
strong rolling back of the state and the empowerment of individual (citizen and market) initiative 
is a primary element of the transformation (cf. Gajduschek and Hajnal 2003; see also e.g. 
Hisrchmann 2003, Jacoby 2001). 
While this view indisputably has some merit, it does not fit well with the reality of many post-
communist countries of the seventies and the eighties, including that of Hungary. Pre-transition 
Hungarian government was not “large and strong”, but rather “large and weak” (Sotiropouolos 
2002). Central policies were made and implemented, not by a remote and unquestionable 
authority but, rather, through complex and subtle bargaining and interest mediation processes 
involving many territorial, sectoral and organisational players (Kovryga and Nickel 2004). 
Therefore, the governmental capacity - and especially the implementation/ administrative 
capacity – was severely limited even before the transition.   
 
 
 
II. Political and Economic Reforms 
 
The first half of the nineties was characterized by the simultaneous problems of (i) economic  
transformation (abrupt breakdown of huge state owned enterprises and large-scale privatization 
of an often anarchistic character), (ii) constitutional/institutional transformation of the political 
system accompanied by a large extent of volatility, and (iii) acute fiscal crisis in all sub-systems 
of the public household. 
These problems – especially the economic/financial ones – culminated in a radical shock therapy 
in 1996. This first period was characterized by extracting wealth from the population by means  
 5 
of high inflation, radical downsizing of the government’s role in providing public services, and 
efforts to create the institutional and policy prerequisites of a functioning market economy.  
From the late nineties, a process of slow but definite economic recovery started, first reaching 
mostly the middle and upper-middle strata but subsequently also some of the lower strata of 
society. This is to a significant extent attributable to successful development policies, both at the 
central level and at some regional centers, aiming at attracting foreign direct investment 
(Hungary was, for about ten years, the number one target country of foreign direct investment in 
the CEE region). 
In the past two to three years, the achievement of the economic and monetary criteria of 
European Monetary Union membership has become a central socio-economic policy issue. This 
is partly because large-scale measures to improve the real income of households – such as a fifty-
per cent across-the-table increase in public service salaries – has seriously exacerbated the fiscal 
burden on the public household, leading to an exceptionally high deficit in the balance of current 
payments (as indicated in the above table).  
 
Much of what happened in the Hungarian public sector under the banner of PMR has been the 
result of dispersed, uncoordinated/”spontaneous” or decentralised ways, not packed neatly in any 
“reform packages”. Since the primary focus of this report is the central government level, the 
difficulty is, to some extent, eased by the fact that a number of public management 
modernisation/reform initiatives of the government have been, throughout the entire period, 
announced in specific Government Resolutions on “Modernisation/Reform of Public 
Administration”. In order to give a comprehensive and well-documented view of the reform 
packages adopted during the post-transition period, a computer aided qualitative analysis of these 
Government Resolutions was carried out. Some rough and tentative results of this analysis are 
briefly summarised below (for a more detailed analysis see Hajnal 2007).  
In a temporal dimension, the overall level of “PMR activity”, as measured by the number of 
reform measures, has been constant and high throughout the nineties. After 2001, this level 
decreased to less than 50 % of previous levels. Within this general class of PMR measures, two 
broad classes can be identified. 
• The first one has much in common with the well-known, major items of the NPM agenda, such 
as downsizing of the state, or introducing elements of agencification, quality management, 
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performance measurement/management, or performance based compensation systems in the civil 
service. 
• The second class of reform measures, coined “CEE specific”, consists of items falling outside 
the scope of NPM reforms, but having some sort of relatively distinct “local flavour” as they 
reflect more the specific needs and/or determination of transition countries. This class includes  
such elements as – often l’art pour l’art – legal fine-tuning or legal-structural retrenchment of  
existing institutions, improving the bureaucratic workflow and control in administrative 
organisations, or measures to achieve EU conformity of certain institutions or policies.  
When comparing the relative proportion of these two classes, one may conclude that the share of  
NPM-type measures within the overall set of reform measures, has constantly been significantly 
rising; this is plotted in the below figure.  
When looking beyond the main labels of NPM vs. CEE type reforms it seems that the 
composition of NPM-type measures has been changing throughout. In the nineties, the emphasis 
was on improving the quality of law-making and, more generally, of governmental decisions by 
employing various techniques of ex ante policy assessment. In the past few years, however, 
increasing emphasis has been put on issues of quality and citizen satisfaction and, more recently, 
to downsizing. 
On the other hand, the composition of “CEE-specific” measures is relatively stable. It is 
interesting to note that only a very modest number of reform measures are justified by EU 
compatibility, although one should bear in mind that coding of the legal texts was based entirely 
on the explicit content, as opposed to the possible latent motifs of the policy makers.  
The above analysis covered the government’s PMR agenda for the 1992–2005 period. From 
2005/2006 on, however, the situation has sharply changed in several respects. Firstly, key 
decisions are no longer collated in Government Resolutions summarising the government’s PMR 
policy of the day. Rather, such decisions became the subject of numerous pieces of various types  
of legal measures as well as of semi-public and non-public documents such as strategy 
documents, operational programmes, and tender materials. Therefore, it became exceedingly 
more difficult to follow governmental decision-making in this field. 
Secondly, there were significant changes in the actual PMR policy too. Namely, the post -2006 
period saw unprecedented radical changes. In the absence of reliable empirical sources, it is 
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difficult to give an exhaustive overview of these changes, but – on the basis of mostly anecdotal 
evidence – two elements seem to be central to them: 
• Downsizing. There are no reliable consistent data on the extent of the downsizing that has taken 
place since 2006 in the central, territorial and local offices of central government administration.  
(It is emblematic that the very system of national HR data collection in the civil service – on 
which earlier figures on the civil service are based – having existed since 1994, has stopped 
operations since it was not able to follow the structural and procedural changes.) One may, 
however, take the risk in saying that the across-the-table decrease in civil service employment in 
the territorial and local levels was well into the two-digit range, in some cases possibly even 
achieving 30 to 50 per cent. 
• Reforming the human resource management system. In 2006 a high level official, responsible 
for preparing and implementing new HRM practices, was appointed in the Prime Minister’s 
Office. Having arrived from the corporate world, his leading ideas were closely tied to radically 
breaking away from the “outmoded” career type civil service characteristic thus far, and 
introducing corporate practices coupled with a harsh deregulation of civil service practices, an 
elimination of legal protection of civil servants’ status, and a radical change in the ruling culture 
of the entire civil service. Although these and some other related measures managed to achieve a 
significant practical impact, at the end of 2007 he had to resign from his position, leaving much 
of the pending changes, as well as initiatives, already on track without political and professional 
leadership (some more details follow in the sub-section on implementation). 
 
III. Civil society and its development 
 
Civil society and community values have a long history in Hungary (and in most other countries 
in the region). In fact, there is a word – kaláka – that describes the mutual support of neighbors, 
relatives at different stages of life (houses built, crops gathered, children looked after, etc.) in 
rural Hungary. Furthermore, during the latter part of the socialism era, there was a large ‘second 
economy’ tolerated by the state as a pragmatic solution to the problems of state planning and 
limited resources. Kaláka in the villages and the shadow economy took off some of the pressures 
caused by the failing state economic planning system (North 2006).  
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After the political changes in 1989, both the second economy and the tradition of kaláka have 
largely disappeared. State-owned factories were privatized, and rural Hungary had to cope with a 
rapidly dwindling agricultural sector that could not compete with western (often subsidized) 
mass-production.   
The weakness of post-socialist civil society allowed the governing politicians to run their 
governments in extremely partisan ways. As a consequence, the electorate has become polarized, 
where voters expect good treatment from the government if “their” party is in power  (Rose-
Ackerman, 2007). Interestingly, partisan politics has been increasing in dominance over time. 
This phenomenon may be explained by the peculiar nature of the Hungarian political transition 
from one-party system to democracy. During the late 80’s, in the so-called ‘round-table’ process, 
members of the ruling communist party, and the opposition agreed on a peaceful transition. The 
consensual approach, however, quickly dissipated once the different factions ran as individual 
parties for election. By the late 90’s, Hungarian politics was deeply polarized between the left 
(including the liberals) and the right.   
Besides voting, there are other ways for the citizens to participate in public policy-making. A 
number of Hungarian laws in areas such as the education and environment mandate advisory 
councils. These are permanent bodies with shifting individual membership that have the right to 
review government proposals and sometimes initiate studies on their own (examples???). The 
recommendations of the advisory councils, however, are not binding for the government (Rose-
Ackerman, 2007). In theory, before major policy changes, the parties affected (labor unions, 
employer’s associations, university student associations, etc.) are consulted, yet due to the highly 
partisan politics nature of the government most often the final outcome reflects the will of the 
political party in government rather than the preference of the affected parties.  
The immediate post-socialist period witnessed a revival of the non-governmental sector. The 
newly acquired freedom of association triggered an explosion in the number of non-profit 
organizations. Initially, most of these organizations received support through international 
donors (foundations, international organizations, etc.). This support, however, dwindled as 
Hungary moved towards full market capitalism, and became member of the European Union. 
Arguably, as foreign foundation support is phased out, most of the NGO’s would have to rely on 
government support (or seek for private donors). The heavy reliance on government support 
 9 
could make these organizations less willing to criticize government policies, which in turn 
further reduces civil society participation in public policy-making. 
According to Rose-Ackerman (2007) there is a need for some basic institutional framework that  
allows and facilitates public participation and democratic accountability. These institutions are a 
nonexecutive president, a constitutional court, an independent audit office, and ombudsman 
“who not only takes individual complaints but can also initiate investigations,” an administrative 
court system, and an independent general prosecutor. At the time of this writing (December 
2010), there are signs that some of these institutions are under pressure from the current ruling 
government party. For the first time since 1989, the president of the Republic is a close ally of 
the prime-minister (breaking with the unwritten tradition of electing someone with an 
independent political background). The parliament (with a 2/3rd governmental majority) limited 
the ability of the constitutional court to rule on fiscal matters (Financial Times, 2010). The 
country’s recently established Budget Office also faces pressures, and possible loss of its 
professional independence due to less than rosy predictions of economic growth and deficit.  
The latest blow to public participation and civil society comes in the form of the new media law  
adopted recently by the Parliament. The new law scrutinizes even the online contents, and allows 
the application of prohibitive fines. It also requires media outlets to apply for governmental 
registration – a practice reminiscent to some of the ex-Soviet republics (Népszabadság, 2010).  
Despite these recent events, the government still enjoys relative popularity among the 
population. This could be attributed to the general disillusionment with the market-based 
democratic system (largely associated with the west) that has replaced the socialist state. Twenty 
years after the fall of the communism, one third of the population still lives below the poverty 
line despite membership in the European Union (Associated Press, 2010).      
 
- Include Kornai 
 
IV. Human resource management 
 
After the Second World War, with the installation of communist rule in Hungary, the earlier 
regulations on civil servants were abolished since the communist government considered all 
employees as employees of the state (private companies were inexistent). With the launch of the 
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New Economic Mechanism (late 60s), government decision-makers gradually acknowledged the 
need for separate treatment of civil servants and other employees (working at state-owned 
companies).  
After the fall of communism, successive governments tried to define and regulate the status of 
public sector employees. Separate laws were created for each type of public sector occupation: 
state and local government public administrators, “public employees” (primarily individuals 
working in education, healthcare), the army, judges, and prosecutors. For public administrators, 
the original legislation prescribed a traditional weberian bureaucracy model (i.e. promotion 
based on seniority, job stability, etc.). Since the mid-2000s, however, there is an increased 
emphasis on market-based human resource management approaches characterized by the 
introduction of entry tests, and reduction of job stability.   
Thus, starting from 2009, civil service open competitions are used to select the candidates for the 
Hungarian public administration. The details of the exam are described in the Governmental 
Decision (kormányrendelet) of 126/2009. The new civil service exam –open to every citizen - 
replaces the old exam that was available only for the civil servants already in the system. The 
idea behind the new exam is to broaden the selection procedure and increase transparency in the 
selection process. There may be, however, possible problems with the new selection procedure. 
The new system does not require hiring based on the results obtained in the exam (employers do 
not have to select the laureates with the highest scores).  Furthermore, the type of material 
included in the test, may in itself create a bias in the selection process; it may well be that the 
tests will have questions focusing on law (since the Hungarian public administration is 
overwhelmingly dominated by law-educated civil servants), which will give an unfair advantage 
to the already overrepresented lawyers (Linder, 2008). 
After the successful open competition exam, the candidate should apply to one of the positions 
advertised by any of the governmental agencies. Then, the candidate is subject to a competency 
test that assesses the candidate’s suitability to the particular position. These competency tests 
evaluate the skills, experience, and knowledge of the particular applicant relevant to the position 
advertised. If the candidate is selected, then he/she is offered the position for a probationary 
period.    
The performance evaluation of the Hungarian civil servants has been addressed at three different  
times. First, in 1992, the Law on Public Servants (1992, XXIII) prescribed the evaluation of the 
 11 
administrators at least every four years, or whenever a promotion occurred. In 2002, the 
government introduced annual individual performance evaluation for every administrator. The 
goal of the new performance evaluation system was to increase the efficiency of the public 
administration system. The new performance evaluation was also linked to higher remuneration.  
Depending on individual performance, the immediate superior could recommend changes in the 
performance bonus anywhere between -20% to +30%. At the time of the introduction of the new 
performance-based evaluation system, the corps of the Hungarian public administrators had 
positive expectations. It turned out, however, that there were no funds set aside for performance-
based pay in the consecutive budget appropriations. Furthermore, some agencies used 
performance evaluation, while others did not. In some cases, the limited amount of performance 
pay was distributed equally among the low-paid public administrators, leaving no funds for the 
true performance-based pay.  In 2006, the government introduced a modified performance 
evaluation system (teljesítményértékelési rendszer – TÉR). While the earlier system was 
introduced immediately to the entire public administration, the new would be introduced 
gradually, and initially only to select categories of public servants. This latest effort, however,  
also contained elements that might create problems in the future. These elements (such as the 
individual level of competency or attitude towards work) might influence performance, but they 
are not part of the worker’s performance per se. Thus, it could further distort the objective 
assessment of the job performance.     
   
A limited number of civil servants are politically appointed public administrators. They usually 
work at the central administration as consultants or advisers to the elected politician. Prior to the 
2006 reform of the public administration, their number was limited in 5 percent of the total 
public servants working in the particular agency. The new law increased the limit to 8 percent.  
They are usually appointed for the same period as the respective politician is in power.   
 
 
1. Selection of workers and managers. Are there civil service exams? Are they effective or 
do they get circumvented? 
2. Status of civil servants in society 
3. Benefits and compensation 
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4. Relationship between civil servants and elected officials  
5. Major reforms in recent years: brief description 
Individual performance management: how is civil servants’ performance evaluated? 
 
V. Financial and Budgetary Management 
 
Hungarian public finances have experienced major difficulties ever since the early 1980’s. The 
socialist state left behind a huge public debt; the first democratically elected government 
inherited the burdens of high interests besides the sudden collapse of the socialist economy. 
While the situation ameliorated with the economic growth of the late 90’s and the austerity 
programs introduced in the middle of the same decade (“Bokros package” – named after the 
finance minister in office at the time), starting from the new millennium successive governments 
allowed lavish spending that ultimately led to serious indebtedness. The Great Recession found 
Hungary exposed and vulnerable;  the country was among the firsts that needed the help of 
the International Monetary Fund and the European Union.  
The public sector plays a significant role in the Hungarian economy. General government 
expenditures account for 49.2% of the GDP (2008).1 The relative large share of the government 
does not necessarily mean better and more public services. In fact, Hungary’s public 
administration is one of the least efficient among OECD countries (OECD, 2010). Total tax 
revenues account for 40.1% of the GDP (2008). The distribution of tax revenues among the 
major tax types is the following: 40% of the total tax revenues come from indirect taxes 
(consumption-based taxes such as sales or value-added tax), around 25% comes from direct taxes 
(primarily income taxes), and the rest are revenues for social security and healthcare (Benedek at 
al. 2004). While the size of the direct taxes (expressed as a percentage of the total GDP) is lower 
than for most other EU countries (Benedek at al.  2004), the tax burden falls on a much smaller 
active workforce. Employment rate in population aged 25-54 (arguably the most active cohort) is 
only around 74%.  
                                                                 
1
 All  data is from the OECD Country Statistical Profiles, 2010 unless stated otherwise. 
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Tax rate on consumption is around 27% (EU-15 average is around 20%), while the tax rate on 
labor is 42.4% (EU-15 average is around 36%) (Data is from 2001. Source: Benedek at al. 2004). 
In both cases the burden of taxation is higher than in most EU countries.  
The structure of the government expenditure (using 2002 data) is the following: approximately 
55% is spent on welfare (education, healthcare, social security, housing, and other welfare 
spending), around 10% is spent on interest payments (on public debt), and the rest is roughly 
equally split between general government expenses (such as administration, police, defense), and 
economic (energy, agriculture, transportation, etc.) and environmental expenses (Source: 
Benedek at al. 2004). The large share of welfare spending suggests that the state plays an 
important role in income redistribution.  
The Hungarian budget is administered based on the Public Finance Act of 1992. The budget is 
proposed by the government, and the Parliament’s role is limited to minor reshuffling of 
budgetary appropriations between the line ministries, without substantively modifying the 
headline figures or correcting unrealistic estimates. The State Audit Office (the state’s 
independent financial monitoring institution established in 1989) assesses the draft budget in the 
course of the parliamentary debate, monitors the implementation of the budget, and signals risks 
in relation to optimistic budget projections. The government, however, is not required to follow 
the SAO’s recommendations, and it can use its own fiscal projections. The budget bill is usually 
approved in the week before Christmas, after which local governments start discussing their 
budgets until the end of March – which is well beyond the start of the fiscal year (Jankovics, 
2008).  
As mentioned earlier, by the second part of the 2000s the Hungarian economy and specifically, 
the public sector reached a highly vulnerable state. The high levels of spending by subsequent 
governments as well as liberal lending practices in the housing market have led to a rapid 
increase in public and private debt. Total external debt reached about 120% of GDP at the end of 
2008 , compared to less than 50% in Poland and 40% in the Czech Republic (OECD, 2010). In 
fact, the revelation that the government has been lying about the actual debt levels led to street 
riots in the fall of 2006. Thus, in fall 2007 the Government adopted a package of laws aimed to 
enhance fiscal sustainability of the country. The key elements of the reform package included the 
following: (1) fiscal sustainability defined as a new constitutional principle, (2) “no increase in 
real terms” rule for the gross central government debt, (3) limits on local government 
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borrowings, (4) establishment of the Legislative Budget Office for independent macroeconomic 
and budgetary projections, and (5) three-year nominal expenditure ceilings for budgetary 
chapters defined by the government (Source: Jankovics, 2008). The fiscal crisis of 2008 sped up 
the reform process, and a new caretaker government (led by the appointed prime-minister, 
Bajnai) implemented a series of painful fiscal reforms. In April 2010, however, as a result of the 
general elections the center-right party of FIDESZ gained over two-thirds of the parliamentary 
seats, and the right to form government. The newly formed government took additional steps to 
regain the country’s fiscal sustainability, but some of these steps were highly controversial; the 
government imposed additional tax on the banks’ profit, and merged the private pension funds 
into the public pension system. Some argue (Financial Times, 2010) that such move would be 
used to temporarily fill the gaps of the budget deficit.    
